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Abstract 28 
 29 
Conflicts between biodiversity conservation and other human activities are intensifying as a result of 30 
growing pressure on natural resources and concomitant demands by some for greater conservation. 31 
Approaches to reducing conflicts are increasingly focusing on engaging stakeholders in processes that 32 
are perceived as fair, i.e. independent and where stakeholders have influence, and which in turn can 33 
generate trust between stakeholders. Hitherto, there has been limited empirical research supporting the 34 
claim that conservation conflicts can be reduced by building trust through fair participation. Using 35 
quantitative and qualitative empirical data from three case studies, we analysed whether fair 36 
participation processes were directly related to conflict resolution and if this relationship was mediated 37 
by trust. Our research provided empirical quantitative evidence that increased trust through fair 38 
processes makes conflict resolution more likely. The qualitative analysis revealed caveats to this 39 
finding, including the different understandings of the definition of conflict by stakeholders, the complex 40 
nature of trust in conservation conflicts where most stakeholders have high levels of ecological 41 
knowledge, and the atypical nature (i.e. presence of a local champion) of one of the case studies. 42 
Building and maintaining trust with landowners and managers may be central to conserving 43 
biodiversity. Such trust-building requires effort and resources, opportunities for appropriate dialogue 44 
between stakeholders and a willingness to share power in terms of knowledge and policy 45 
implementation, especially when local stakeholders are dependent on and knowledgeable about natural 46 
resources. 47 
 48 
     49 
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 53 
 54 
Introduction 55 
 56 
Increased pressure placed on natural resources has resulted in a growing number of conservation 57 
conflicts, or “situations that occur when two or more parties with strongly held opinions clash over 58 
conservation objectives and when one party is perceived to assert its interests at the expense of another” 59 
(Redpath et al., 2013: 100; see also Dickman, 2010; Henle et al., 2008; Niemela et al., 2005; Redpath 60 
et al., 2015; Young et al., 2005, 2007, 2010). While such conflicts can have negative repercussions on 61 
biodiversity and people, they can also be positive in terms of increasing democratic legitimacy and 62 
public trust in politics and decision-making (Young et al., 2012). Here, we understand resolution of 63 
conflicts not necessarily leading to a solution that all parties agree on, but instead creating a process 64 
where people can share their opinions on conservation. Such a process may in turn lead to a better 65 
understanding of different values, attitudes and goals, and the potential to seek shared solutions to 66 
conflicts.  67 
 68 
Building on the above definition of conflict resolution, having more people involved in conservation 69 
issues, or more ‘public participation’, has been suggested as one way to resolve conflicts (Young et al., 70 
2013a). However, much of the existing work on public participation has focussed on the fairness of 71 
participation processes (Chess and Purcell, 1999; Beierle and Konisky, 2001), rather than how effective 72 
public participation is at producing outcomes like conflict resolution. There has, to date, been limited 73 
empirical evidence to back the claim that conservation conflicts can be resolved through more or 74 
effective public participation.  75 
 76 
Fairness in public participation means that all those affected by certain decisions are represented and, 77 
importantly, that procedures enable them to have an input into the format and content of discussions. In 78 
situations where values or interests conflict, for example over conservation objectives, two aspects of 79 
fairness have been highlighted as being important: ‘independence’ and ‘influence’ (Webler, 1995; 80 
Rowe and Frewer, 2000; Young et al., 20013a, 2013b). In the context of conservation conflicts, we 81 
define an ‘independent’ participatory process as one which is unbiased, i.e. where certain participants 82 
are not imposing their interests at the expense of others. We define ‘influence’ as a process that allows 83 
those involved to have an input that has a genuine impact on the process and outcomes of participation, 84 
one potential outcome being conflict resolution. The interrelation between independence and influence 85 
is poorly studied, although one hypothesis (see conceptual framework: Figure 1, hypothesis 0) is that 86 
the more independent a process, the more influence stakeholders have. As mentioned earlier, there is 87 
limited empirical evidence to back the claim that fair participatory processes (i.e. processes that are 88 
independent and where those involved have influence) are more likely to lead to the resolution of 89 
conservation conflicts (see conceptual framework: Figure 1, hypotheses 1 & 2). 90 
 91 
Figure 1. Conceptual model illustrating how conflict resolution is affected directly and indirectly, via 92 
trust, by the independence and influence of participatory processes 93 
 94 
 95 
Closely linked to fairness is the notion of trust, both in institutions (institutional trust) and the 96 
individuals (inter-personal trust) involved in a participation process (Davenport et al., 2007). The 97 
common assumption is that trust among and between actors can become an outcome of participation, 98 
which in turn, helps alleviate conflict (see Figure 1, hypotheses 3 & 4). Conversely, unfair processes 99 
can lead to distrust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust is therefore a key feature of the participation and 100 
conflict literatures, but also other fields such as social psychology, risk, peace studies and political 101 
science.  102 
 103 
Trust is an abstract and context-dependent concept, but is a fundamental aspect of social relationships 104 
(Möllering, 2006) whereby people “accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 105 
intentions or behaviours of others” (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). Trust develops through repeated 106 
interactions between parties, and may be an important driver of collaboration (Stern & Coleman, 2015) 107 
and may reduce harmful conflict by building relationships through sharing of knowledge and values 108 
(Cvetkovitch and Winter, 2003). This has led authors to identify lack of trust, for example with 109 
conservation agencies (McCool, 2000) as “often the most fundamental barrier to the negotiation and 110 
construction of natural resource management plans” (Lachapelle & McCool, 2012: 322) potentially 111 
leading to non-compliance and opposition to conservation initiatives (Stern, 2008; Heemskerk et al., 112 
2015). Building or maintaining trust therefore appears central to biodiversity management (Davenport 113 
et al., 2007), and has been highlighted in a range of literatures relevant to conservation, linked to 114 
invasive species management (Estevez et al. 2015), the success of restoration projects (Metcalf et al., 115 
2015), pro-environment behaviours (Wynveen & Sutton, 2015), building social capital (Hunt et al. 116 
2015) and conservation psychology (Clayton and Myers 2015). The notion of trust, however, still 117 
remains unclear with the lack of evidence on the role of institutional and inter-personal trust in 118 
conservation cited as a knowledge gap (Davenport et al., 2007), with subsequent effects on conflict 119 
resolution. 120 
 121 
Although much has been written about participation, fairness and trust, and the potential links with 122 
conflict management, no empirical study has yet explored the extent to which fair participation 123 
processes are directly related to conflict resolution and the extent to which this relationship is mediated 124 
by trust (see Figure 1). This study addresses these important knowledge gaps, providing empirical 125 
evidence for the role of trust in conservation conflict resolution, and outlines the implications of these 126 
findings for future biodiversity conservation efforts.  127 
 128 
Research design and methods 129 
 130 
Three case studies were selected for this study and are described more extensively in Young et al., 131 
(2013a,b) and Scottish Natural Heritage (2004; 2007). Whilst all three case studies were based in 132 
Scotland, they encompass a breadth of habitats (coastal, riverine, forest, farmland, moorland), a range 133 
of stakeholders (NGOs, private and public land owners and managers, scientists) and objectives 134 
(conservation, forestry, hunting, fishing) that are common in conservation conflicts globally. The main 135 
criteria for case study selection were the existence of a conservation conflict, and the existence of a 136 
management plan that required, at some stage of its development and/or implementation, the active 137 
participation of a range of local stakeholders. The management plan was linked to the European 138 
‘Habitats Directive’ (92/43/EEC, the Directive on the conservation of natural and semi-natural habitats 139 
and of wild flora and fauna), which aims to “enable the natural habitat types and species’ habitats 140 
concerned to be maintained or, where appropriate, restored at a favourable conservation status in their 141 
natural range” (Habitats Directive, Article 3(1)). In order to achieve this aim, a network (the Natura 142 
2000 network) is made up of Special Protection Areas (SPAs) set up under the auspices of the Directive 143 
on the Conservation of Wild Birds (79/419/EEC, colloquially known as the ‘Birds Directive’), and 144 
Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) to comply with requirements under the ‘Habitats Directive’ 145 
(Evans, 2012). Article 6 of the Habitats Directive states that Member States are required to “establish 146 
the necessary conservation measures”, for example management plans, statutory, administrative or 147 
contractual measures (Article 6 (1)) with the early involvement in a bottom-up approach of local 148 
stakeholders that live or depend on those areas (European Commission, 2000: Annex II). 149 
 150 
In the Bladnoch case study, the “River Bladnoch SAC Atlantic Salmon Catchment Management Plan” 151 
was commissioned by Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) in 2004 and produced by the Galloway Fishery 152 
Trust in 2007. Its objectives were to identify potential or actual negative impacts on the SAC; to assess 153 
existing management; and to identify and prioritise further measures required (Scottish Natural 154 
Heritage, 2007). A conservation conflict existed between stakeholders with fishery and forestry 155 
interests. Fishery stakeholders, mainly fishermen and businesses promoting fishing, perceived that 156 
forestry practices were contributing to the continued acidification of the river Bladnoch, which in turn 157 
was leading to a decline in salmon returning to and spawning in the river (Young, 2010).  158 
 159 
In the Moray Firth case study, the “Moray Firth Seal Management Plan”, covering seven Special Areas 160 
of Conservation for bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncates), common or harbour seal (Phoca vitulina) 161 
and Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), was developed in 2005 to address the conflict between seal 162 
conservation and salmon fisheries. This conflict centred on the uncertainty over the extent that seals 163 
were responsible for the decline of salmon and salmon fisheries. Seal conservationists perceived that 164 
seals had little impact on salmon fisheries, whilst fishermen and netsmen were concerned that seals 165 
were contributing significantly to the decline of salmon (Young et al., 2012).  166 
 167 
In the Forth and Borders moorlands case study, the “Forth and Borders Moorlands Management 168 
Scheme”, centred on 12 protected areas, aimed to “maintain and improve the habitats and species” 169 
(Scottish Natural Heritage, 2004: 2) associated with these protected areas. The most contentious conflict 170 
was between stakeholders with interests in raptor conservation and those with interests in grouse 171 
management (Thirgood et al., 2000). Many moorlands in England and Scotland are managed for red 172 
grouse (Lagopus l. scoticus) which are a prey species of raptors such as hen harrier (Circus cyaneus), 173 
peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) and golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos). Stakeholders with an interest 174 
in grouse management fear reduced income and job losses if the raptor populations are uncontrolled, 175 
whereas stakeholders with interests in raptor conservation strive to protect raptors.  176 
 177 
Qualitative and quantitative data were gathered in this study to test the following hypotheses (see also 178 
introduction and Figure 1): 179 
- H0: The perceived independence of a process of developing a management plan has an effect 180 
on the influence stakeholders have on a management plan. 181 
- H1: Conflict resolution is affected directly by the perceived independence of a process of 182 
developing a management plan. 183 
- H2: Conflict resolution is affected directly by the perceived influence stakeholders have on a 184 
management plan process. 185 
- H3: The perceived independence of a process of developing a management plan influences 186 
perceptions of conflict resolution indirectly through perceived increased trust between 187 
stakeholders. 188 
- H4: The perceived influence stakeholders have on a management plan affects perceptions of 189 
conflict resolution indirectly through perceived increased trust between stakeholders. 190 
 191 
In terms of the qualitative data collection, a total of 59 in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried 192 
out (January to July 2009) with stakeholders involved in the development and/or implementation of the 193 
three management plans (see Table 1).  194 
 195 
Table 1. Distribution of interviewees according to background (GA=Government Advisers; SA= 196 
scientific advisers; BU=Biodiversity users) and case study (B=Bladnoch; M= Moray Firth; F=Forth and 197 
Borders).  198 
Interviewee background Bladnoch  Moray Firth  Forth and Borders Moorlands 
Representatives of the Scottish 
Government or government 
departments 
 
BGA1-
BGA5 
MGA1-MGA4 FGA1-FGA6 
Scientific advisers BSA1-BSA2 MSA1-MSA6 FSA1-FSA4 
Biodiversity users BBU1-
BBU12 
MBU1-MBU10 FBU1-FBU10 
 199 
All interviews, excepting three, were face-to-face. Evidence gathered from documentary data enabled 200 
the selection of initial interviewees, who then identified further contacts within the stakeholder network 201 
associated with each of these sites through a process of ‘snowball’ or chain referral sampling (Lewis-202 
Beck et al., 2004). To reduce any potential bias in the selection of interviewees by interviewees, the 203 
snowballing sample was checked against the groups and individuals that were known to have taken part 204 
in the development of the management plan. No groups or individuals were found to be missing.  205 
 206 
All stakeholders interviewed had detailed knowledge at the local scale of the process of developing the 207 
management plan, and of the conflicts in each case study. The stakeholders interviewed were divided 208 
into three social groups. The first group comprised local government and government department 209 
representatives responsible for implementing or regulating biodiversity policy (referred to as GA in 210 
later quotes). These stakeholders had knowledge of the process of developing and implementing the 211 
management plans, and the socio-economic contexts of the case studies. The second group comprised 212 
scientific and technical advisers external to governmental bodies (e.g. university, independent research 213 
organisations) (SA). This group had knowledge of the process of developing and implementing the 214 
management plans, and the ecological contexts of the case studies. The third group comprised 215 
biodiversity users, i.e. local stakeholders such as farmers, fishermen, fishery managers, foresters and 216 
local businesses owners who were affected by or involved directly in the management of the target 217 
species/habitats in the protected areas (BU).  218 
 219 
Semi-structured interviews sought to document interviewees’ experiences of developing the 220 
management plan and their perceptions of outcomes. Interviewees were asked to discuss and then score, 221 
on a scale from one to five (where 1 was the lowest score and 5 the highest), different criteria (see Table 222 
2) relating to the process of developing the management plan and the resulting social outcomes. The 223 
qualitative data analysis required all interviews to be transcribed verbatim and coded using NVivo 224 
qualitative data analysis software (QSR International 2010). The coding used generic theory-based 225 
criteria (Rowe and Frewer, 2000) and social and environmental outcome criteria (Beierle and Konisky, 226 
2001) derived from the public participation literature (Table 2), focussing on general perceptions of the 227 
conflict by the stakeholders involved, and their perceptions of independence, influence, trust and 228 
conflict resolution.  229 
 230 
Table 2. Theoretical framework for the evaluation of conflict resolution based on theory-based and 231 
social outcome criteria 232 
 233 
Evaluation focus Criteria measured 
Procedural evaluation  
Independence 
Was the participation process carried out in an independent, 
unbiased way? 
Influence 
Did participant input have a genuine impact on the management 
plan? 
Social outcome evaluation 
Increased trust Was trust increased between stakeholders? 
Conflict resolution Was conflict resolved among stakeholders? 
 234 
The quantitative links between these process and social outcome criteria were analysed using path 235 
analysis (Shipley 2002), which allowed for both direct and indirect effects of independence and 236 
influence on conflict resolution. The path analysis tested five hypotheses (see also Figure 1). 237 
 238 
In total, a sample size of 49 sets of responses from local actors were analysed in the path analysis (we 239 
did not use all 59 responses due to missing responses for some of the criteria from some actors). These 240 
responses were the recorded scores, on an ordinal scale from one to five (where 1 was the lowest score 241 
and 5 the highest), for each of the criteria relating to the process of developing the management plan 242 
and the resulting social outcomes (Table 2). We quantified the strength of different pathways in the path 243 
model by calculating the product of standardised regression coefficients along each pathway of interest. 244 
Regression coefficients were assumed to be the same for all three case studies as responses from actors 245 
were pooled across case studies in the path analysis. Estimates for indirect pathways are presented with 246 
associated 95% confidence intervals generated by simulating from a normal distribution with a mean 247 
and standard error estimated from the path analysis. The path analysis was implemented using the 248 
lavaan package (Rosseel 2012) in R (R Core Team, 2014), where all variables in the model were treated 249 
as ordinal, modelled to have a latent normal distribution with unknown thresholds at the boundaries of 250 
each ordinal class. The path analysis was structured as a series of linear regressions, where each linear 251 
regression defined the relationship between different levels of the model for i=1 to 49 respondents: 252 
 253 
conflict resolutioni = a + b1*trusti + b2*independencei + b3*influencei 254 
trusti = c + d1*independencei + d2*influencei 255 
influencei = e + f*independencei 256 
 257 
Using this approach (lavaan package in R) we were unable to include a structural random effect for the 258 
influence of social group and case study that was previously identified as important (Young et al., 259 
2013a). It is possible to include this structural variable within the Bayesian framework, therefore we 260 
also fitted the path analysis using the Bayesian framework to assess the influence of including a random 261 
effect for social group and case study on model inference (Supplementary Material), albeit with the 262 
response considered as continuous rather than ordinal. These analyses demonstrated that model 263 
inference was best conducted with variables modelled as ordinal data, and that the influence of the 264 
structural random effect was minimal (Supplementary Material), supporting a decision to work within 265 
the limitations of the R package used. Therefore, all results presented here derive from the analysis of 266 
ordinal variables using the lavaan package. 267 
 268 
Results 269 
 270 
The perceived independence of a process of developing a management plan has an effect on the 271 
influence stakeholders have on a management plan (H0). 272 
 273 
The quantitative analysis showed a strong positive direct effect of independence on influence 274 
(standardised estimate: 0.401, standard error: 0.103, Z: 2.496, P: 0.013; Fig. 2).  275 
 276 
Figure 2. Path analysis diagram for how conflict resolution is affected directly and indirectly by process 277 
variables (independence and influence) and social outcomes (trust) across the three case studies. All 278 
lines in the diagram represent a specific linear model. Thick solid lines represent strong evidence for an 279 
effect (P value < 0.05), dotted lines represent no clear effect. Standardised regression coefficient 280 
estimates are given with standard errors in parentheses. ‘+’ predicted positive relationship, ‘-‘ predicted 281 
negative relationship. The width of the arrows is proportional to the estimate of effect size for all 282 
significant relationships. 283 
 284 
 285 
 286 
 287 
 288 
 289 
 290 
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 292 
 293 
 294 
 295 
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 297 
The qualitative analysis demonstrated that two of the case studies, the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders, 298 
were perceived by interviewees as top-down or imposed, driven mainly by the country agency (in this 299 
case the Scottish Natural Heritage, SNH), who were seen by biodiversity users in the Bladnoch as 300 
“pushing [...] a lot really about what should go in and what shouldn’t go in” [BBU4]. Only in the Moray 301 
Firth case study did stakeholders refer to a bottom-up process, perceived as more independent. Results 302 
from the qualitative analysis highlighted that the influence stakeholders perceived they had on the 303 
INDEPENDENCE
TRUST
CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT
INFLUENCE
+0.401 (0.103)
+0.124 (0.169)
+0.349 (0.118)
+0.404 (0.163)
+0.532 (0.099)
+0.304 (0.116)
process of developing, and the content of, the management plan was linked to the perceived 304 
independence of the plan. As such, in the case of the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders plan, interviewees, 305 
especially biodiversity users who felt the plans were top-down, felt their influence was minimal. This 306 
led one fisherman in the Bladnoch to compare the situation to one whereby stakeholders doubted 307 
whether their input could actually make any difference: “these power-that-be have their own opinion 308 
and they’re not really interested in other peoples’ opinions on how it should be run” [BBU7].  309 
 310 
In the Moray Firth, the process was perceived as more independent, in part because the person leading 311 
the management plan worked for a District Salmon Fishery Board and was known by local stakeholders 312 
including fishermen, who were often resistant to seal conservation. Although one scientist voiced the 313 
concern that there was “so little room for manoeuvring here […] there’s very little influence they could 314 
have” [MSA1], interviewees that were involved in the process felt that within these narrow confines 315 
they were broadly able to have an influence on the plan, voicing their views and concerns, resulting in 316 
greater sense of “being in control and […] in the lead” [MGA2].  317 
 318 
Conflict resolution is affected directly by the perceived independence of a process of developing a 319 
management plan (H1) 320 
 321 
The quantitative analysis showed a weak positive direct effect of independence on conflict resolution 322 
(standardised estimate: 0.304, standard error: 0.116, Z: 1.844, P: 0.065; Fig. 2, Table 3).  323 
 324 
Table 3. Estimates of the strength of direct and indirect pathways by which independence affects 325 
conflict resolution in the three case studies. Indirect estimates are the product of the standardised path 326 
coefficients along each pathway of interest with associated 95% confidence intervals.  327 
Impact of 
independence 
Standardised 
estimate 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Standard 
error 
Z score P value 
Direct 0.304 -0.0172,  0.630 0.165 1.844 0.065 
Indirect via Trust 0.141 0.000897, 
0.355 
- - - 
Indirect via Influence  
and Trust 
0.0862 0.00660, 0.214 
 
- - - 
 328 
The qualitative analysis highlighted a more nuanced link between independence and conflict resolution. 329 
Whilst the Moray Firth was considered more independent than the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders 330 
(see section 4.1), and most interviewees evaluated conflict resolution highly in the Moray Firth, this did 331 
not mean that all stakeholders perceived the conflict as resolved.   332 
 333 
This finding was due to different understandings of the definition of conflict by stakeholders in all case 334 
studies. In the Bladnoch, government advisers referred only to “challenges” [BGA3] and “tensions in 335 
terms of pace of change, those sorts of things” [BGA5], whilst biodiversity users identified a conflict 336 
between “the fishery boys […] trying to improve the river and the forestry just want to get on with the 337 
forestry” [BBU3]. In the Forth and Borders, a government adviser outlined the difficulties in 338 
determining “what the conflicts are - it also depends on what’s perceived as conflicts” [FBGA1]. In the 339 
Moray Firth, the government advisers referred to inter-personal conflicts, i.e. “a conflict between 340 
salmon fisheries, both the rod angler and the netsmen and seal conservation interests” [MGA2]. The 341 
scientific advisers saw the conflict around misperceptions about seals, with one scientist explaining that 342 
“the conflicts with the DSFB and the problems with seals that were in the estuaries have been resolved 343 
- they don’t shoot seals in the estuaries anymore. Huge conflict resolved. That’s gone, that’s massive” 344 
[MSA6]. The netsmen, and fishermen to a lesser degree, perceived conflict as being intrinsically linked 345 
to the issue of declining salmon stocks, and were, accordingly, disappointed with the process, which 346 
although a step in the right direction in terms of bringing stakeholders “together finding common 347 
ground, agreeing common ground [… had not…] made a dent on what needs to be done” [MBU9] in 348 
terms of controlling seal populations. Finally, for those stakeholders outside the process, namely animal 349 
welfare representatives, the conflict related to the numbers of seals shot. From their perspective, conflict 350 
resolution in the management plan was “an improvement on the current situation but only because 351 
you’re starting from a completely unacceptable situation” [MBU4].  352 
 353 
 354 
Conflict resolution is affected directly by the perceived influence stakeholders have on a management 355 
plan process (H2) 356 
 357 
The quantitative analysis provided no evidence for a direct effect of influence on conflict resolution 358 
(standardised estimate: 0.124, standard error: 0.169, Z: 0.804, P: 0.421; Fig. 2, Table 4). 359 
 360 
Table 4. Estimates of the strength of direct and indirect pathways by which influence affects conflict 361 
resolution in the three case studies. Indirect estimates are the product of the standardised path 362 
coefficients along each pathway of interest with associated 95% confidence intervals.  363 
Impact of influence Standardised 
estimate 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Standard 
error 
Z score P value 
Direct 0.124 -0.177, 0.424 0.154 0.804 0.421 
Indirect via Trust 0.215 0.0411, 0.417 - - - 
 364 
The qualitative analysis provided some evidence of a link between influence and conflict resolution, 365 
but this was closely linked to the perceived independence of the process (see section 4.1) and the degree 366 
to which stakeholders felt their knowledge had fed into the process.  367 
 368 
In the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders plan, interviewees, especially biodiversity users who felt the 369 
plans were not independent, felt their influence on conflict resolution was minimal. The perception of 370 
biodiversity users in the Forth and Borders was that they had valuable knowledge to feed into the 371 
process that could help resolve the conflict between raptor conservation and grouse management, but 372 
that their knowledge was being ignored. One gamekeeper commented on the fact that while it was 373 
important that “the guys on the ground are actually listened to [...] I think keepers per se in Scotland 374 
feel that they’re not” [FBBU4]. In the Moray Firth, however, the industry-led approach allowed local 375 
knowledge to be collected and integrated into the process of conflict resolution. As one scientist put it, 376 
“One of the really exciting things that James [Dr Butler] managed to do was to get all the DSFBs to say 377 
how many seals they’d been shooting over the year, and normally nobody will say anything about that, 378 
they won’t tell” [MSA6]. A situation was reached in which “it was the salmon guys working directly 379 
with the scientists and actually getting some robust data back” [MBU1], thereby augmenting scientific 380 
knowledge and strengthening the acceptance of the data by the fishermen and netsmen, who could “see 381 
that the figures that are coming out are not just from conservationists who want to stop everyone taking 382 
salmon” [MBU1]. In turn, this dispelled certain beliefs, so that “preconceived ideas of what was 383 
happening have changed enormously” [MSA6], and helped to clarify certain issues. For example one 384 
fisherman acknowledged that “one of the bits of research which I accept as probably being correct is 385 
that certain seals predate salmon and others don’t” [MBU2]. The gathering and acceptance of scientific 386 
and local knowledge was instrumental according to some interviewees in enabling conflict management 387 
to focus on those seals causing the most damage. Whether this was sufficient in terms of conflict 388 
resolution was still up for debate for other interviewees (see also section 4.2).  389 
 390 
The perceived independence of a process of developing a management plan influences perceptions of 391 
conflict resolution indirectly through perceived increased trust between stakeholders (H3) 392 
 393 
The quantitative analysis showed a strong positive link between perceived independence and trust 394 
standardised estimate: 0.349, standard error: 0.118, Z: 2.111, P: 0.035; Fig. 2, Table 3) and a strong 395 
positive effect of trust on conflict management (standardised estimate: 0.404, standard error: 0.163, Z: 396 
2.445, P: 0.015; Fig. 2, Table 3). There was consequently a strong positive indirect effect of 397 
independence on conflict resolution via trust (standardised estimate 0.141, 95% confidence interval: -398 
0.000897 – 0.355, Table 3).   399 
 400 
The quantitative analysis results were reflected in the qualitative analysis, where perceived 401 
independence of processes impacted on trust between stakeholders, leading to a more likely positive 402 
perception of conflict resolution.  In the Bladnoch, the process of developing the plan had been helpful 403 
in enabling stakeholders to understand different perspectives better. However, due to a perceived top-404 
down drive of the plan, for some interviewees, this increased awareness of the workings of government 405 
departments emphasised their failings: “it just makes your heart sink a bit when you get this sort of stuff 406 
because you know the people whose job it is to sit in an office and produce all this and it’s a very 407 
different world from […] people who are actually out in the real world actually doing things [BBU1]”. 408 
As such, some biodiversity users felt they trusted government departments less than at the beginning of 409 
the process, despite or even because of increased knowledge of their workings. In the Moray Firth, the 410 
fact that the person leading the process of developing the plan was perceived as independent, the way 411 
in which he managed the process of including all stakeholders in the development of the plan, and the 412 
focus explicitly on addressing conflict all contributed to increased trust between stakeholders and a 413 
perceived improvement on the resolution of conflict. In the Forth and Borders, increasing trust between 414 
land owners, managers and the country agency was seen to be dependent on who was implementing the 415 
plans, resulting in a consultant commenting that “some area officer just don’t know their farmers, they 416 
don’t have the time and the history with them to [...] build a relationship with them” [FBSA1]. So while 417 
individual management plans, which sought to increase contact between SNH and land owners and 418 
managers, resulted in a situation in which conflicts were addressed, compromises were reached and 419 
trust was increased between individuals, this was highly dependent on who the area officers were, 420 
stability in their post and the time they invested in getting to know land owners and managers. The 421 
overall scheme, however, was perceived as having been largely unsuccessful in increasing trust between 422 
the key stakeholders involved, and in turn addressing the more contentious conflict of raptor 423 
conservation and grouse management.  424 
 425 
The perceived influence stakeholders have on a management plan affects perceptions of conflict 426 
resolution indirectly through perceived increased trust between stakeholders (H4) 427 
 428 
The quantitative analysis showed a strong positive link between influence and trust (standardised 429 
estimate 0.532, error: 0.099, Z: 5.964, P: <0.001; Fig. 2, Table 4). It follows, as in Section 3.3, that there 430 
was a strong positive indirect relationship between influence and conflict resolution via trust 431 
(standardised estimate 0.215, 95% confidence interval: 0.0411 – 0.417; Table 4). 432 
 433 
In the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders case studies, scientific advisers, local land owners and managers 434 
perceived a close-knit relationship between the government departments. This perceived relationship 435 
led other stakeholders to view the process as a reflection of compliance rather than change, i.e. a process 436 
where influence and trust were seen as low. In the Moray Firth, government and scientific advisers, and 437 
biodiversity users trusted the person leading the process. Based on this trust, they felt they could have 438 
an influence on the plan and its outcomes, including conflict resolution. The process of integrating more 439 
science, exchanging information and organising training courses for the marksmen, had a number of 440 
positive results, particularly in terms of increasing trust between certain stakeholders, such as the 441 
fishermen and scientific advisers. One fisherman highlighted the fact that while sceptical initially, he 442 
now had “a good working relationship with [the scientists] and […] [not] a bad thing to say about them” 443 
[MBU6]. Trust was also seen to have increased from the point of view of the Scottish Government and 444 
government department representatives who perceived that this trust came from “getting to know where 445 
they’re coming from, that they’re not all mad axe-men and vice-versa, knowing that we’re not green-446 
wellied mad men” [MGA2]. The effects of this increased trust between stakeholders were reflected in a 447 
change in attitudes, so that “it wasn’t a case now that they were going out and saying “there’s a seal, 448 
let me shoot it”, they were going out and saying “there’s a seal in the river but is it actually causing a 449 
problem?” [MGA3]. This change in attitudes was also highlighted by an animal welfare group 450 
representative, who commented on how “some of the bailiffs I found had learned from it and were 451 
educating others so there was definitely improvement there” [MBU5]. However a number of 452 
interviewees from the fishery boards and many netsmen were more cautious in their views on trust. To 453 
explain this, one netsman referred to the fact that they could not be completely open during the process 454 
because “there could be SNH folk there that would take offence because it’s not everybody’s thing at 455 
all [shooting seals]” [MBU3]. Others placed a strong emphasis on the fact that the plan worked only if 456 
all fishermen respected the arrangement, relying on the fact that no-one wanted to be responsible for 457 
letting it fall through. Although some interpreted this as trust between all stakeholders, others perceived 458 
it more as a threat from Government. One fisherman concluded by saying that although the process “did 459 
increase the trust […] it depends on if you say “did you trust them?” - you didn’t fully trust them” 460 
[MBU10]. 461 
 462 
 463 
Discussion 464 
 465 
Our research provides empirical quantitative evidence that increased trust through fair participatory 466 
processes makes conflict resolution more likely. In addition to this quantitative evidence, the qualitative 467 
analysis revealed three subtle, yet important, nuances.  468 
 469 
The first was the differences in terms of interviewee understanding of what the conflict was about and 470 
in turn what he/she understood as conflict resolution. In all three case studies, the different groups had 471 
a different views of what the conflict was about, or indeed whether there was a conservation conflict at 472 
all. In some cases there was a reluctance on the part of scientific adviser and government actors to 473 
acknowledge perceptions of conflict by local actors, preferring instead to see them as challenges or 474 
tensions. Current literature on conflict management emphasises the need to understand conflict as 475 
perceived by different groups (Redpath et al., 2013; Redpath et al., 2015a,b). According to our 476 
qualitative analysis, this principle may not have filtered down yet to those country agencies responsible 477 
for managing conflicts, in part due to a reluctance to acknowledge conflicts, but also perhaps due to 478 
lack of trust towards local stakeholders. The lack of acknowledgement of conflict led to increased 479 
frustration from other stakeholders. Whilst the different understandings of the conflict and its resolution 480 
may have affected institutional trust, it did not appear to affect interpersonal trust. In the Bladnoch and 481 
the Moray Firth case studies, levels of trust towards specific individuals was still very high. Such scale 482 
mismatches between institutional and interpersonal trust are not uncommon (Stern & Coleman, 2015). 483 
 484 
The second was the complex nature of trust in conservation conflicts where stakeholders have high 485 
levels of ecological knowledge. Based on the qualitative data, institutional distrust highlighted in all 486 
case studies may not have only been due to lack of shared values as a basis for trust, as suggested by 487 
Cvetkovitch and Winter (2003), or to procedural fairness (Lind and Tyler, 1988) but more importantly 488 
linked to high levels of knowledge held by biodiversity users dependent on natural resources. There is 489 
widespread recognition of the importance of integrating different types of knowledge in the 490 
management of natural resources, as established in international policy (Article 8(j) of the UN 491 
Convention on Biological Diversity; the Aarhus Conventions and associated EU Directive on public 492 
participation), and the academic literature (e.g. Carmen et al., 2015, Charnley et al., 2007; Failing et al., 493 
2007; Raymond et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2012; Turnbull, 1997). Much work has been developed on 494 
the need to integrate local ecological knowledge, defined as “the body of knowledge held by a specific 495 
group of people about their local ecosystems” (Scholz et al., 2004: 336), through more inclusive and 496 
fair approaches so that decisions are socially better and politically accepted (Harrison and Burgess, 497 
2000; McCool et al., 2000), and may contribute to conflict resolution (Close & Hall, 2006; Young et 498 
al., 2010).  499 
 500 
Despite the widespread acceptance of multi-stakeholder knowledge bases, concerns are frequently 501 
expressed by scientists and government organisations regarding the integration of such local knowledge 502 
in the management of natural resources (Wynne, 1992; Innes and Booher, 2010). This is often linked 503 
to perceptions that local knowledge is somehow lacking in scientific rigour or merit (Close & Hall, 504 
2006; Failing et al., 2007), or broader issues of power-sharing between state and non-state actors (Taylor 505 
et al., 2012). Whilst in all case studies biodiversity users felt they had high levels of ecological 506 
knowledge to integrate in the management plans, only in the Moray Firth (perceived as a fair process), 507 
was there an aim to integrate such knowledge, values and interests. This meant that many stakeholders 508 
felt their knowledge was acknowledged, and thus more readily accepted the information emerging from 509 
the process. 510 
 511 
The results of this study suggest that integrating local ecological knowledge was highly dependent on 512 
fair processes aiming to build trust. Such trust did not appear to emerge simply through increased 513 
interactions (interpersonal trust) but from a genuine willingness to share power, in terms of knowledge 514 
and decision implementation, especially in situations where local stakeholders are dependent on and 515 
knowledgeable about natural resources (Davenport et al., 2007; Butler et al., 2015). This finding 516 
highlights that confounding factors may prevent trust and intended behaviours to lead to action, in this 517 
case conflict resolution (Stern & Coleman, 2015). If such willingness is absent, we argue that trust and 518 
potential subsequent conflict resolution may be difficult to achieve.  519 
 520 
The third nuance was the rather atypical situation in the Moray Firth case study with an industry-led 521 
approach, focussed on conflict resolution, championed by an individual trusted by scientists, 522 
government advisers and local stakeholders. In this case study, many stakeholders had high levels of 523 
affinitive trust towards this individual, with a perception of social connectedness and shared values 524 
(Stern & Coleman, 2015). Although this situation led to an environment where conflict resolution 525 
through increased trust was more likely, such a local champion may not be present in all conservation 526 
conflict situations. Indeed, the situation in the Bladnoch and Forth and Borders, where the process of 527 
developing management plans was led by country agencies may be more typical, potentially leading to 528 
issues over perceived fairness, potential mistrust and conflicts that are either not acknowledged by 529 
certain stakeholders, or not addressed and resolved.  530 
 531 
Conclusion 532 
 533 
Our research highlights the importance of building and maintaining institutional and interpersonal trust 534 
between stakeholders where conservation conflicts occur. As a first step this requires state country 535 
agencies responsible for implementing biodiversity policy, such as protected area designation and 536 
management, to acknowledge that conflicts exist but are a healthy indicator. Conservation conflicts can 537 
be viewed as an opportunity to build interpersonal and institutional trust with stakeholders, potentially 538 
liaising more or better with those ‘on the ground’ with perceived legitimacy. Building and maintaining 539 
procedural trust and strong working relationships with landowners and managers may be the most 540 
important aspect for country agencies responsible for managing and sustaining biodiversity. Such trust-541 
building requires effort and resources however, as well as developing opportunities for appropriate 542 
dialogue between stakeholders to identify shared problems and in turn shared solutions. Importantly, it 543 
may also require a willingness to share power, in terms of knowledge and decision implementation, 544 
especially in situations where local stakeholders are dependent on and knowledgeable about natural 545 
resources.  546 
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